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ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF FISHERY POLICIES IN LAMON BAY, 
QUEZON, PHILIPPINES 
 
Maribec Campos, Blanquita Pantoja, Nerlita Manalili and Marideth Bravo 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Lamon Bay is one of the most important fishing grounds in the Philippines. In spite of 
this, most fishermen in the area live in poverty and their plight is getting worse. Fish 
catch is declining by 13.5% a year, more than double the reduction experienced 
elsewhere in the country. Current fishery policies for the area have failed to improve the 
situation but no research has been done to find out why. Are the policies poorly 
designed? Or are they not adequately enforced? 
This report attempts to fill this information gap about the reasons for the policy failure. 
Drawing on data from secondary sources and an original survey, it uses a bioeconomic 
model to simulate the effects of changes in the enforcement levels of three current 
policies - ban on electric shiners, regulation on fish cage, as well as both electric shiners 
and fish cages. Government investments on different levels of enforcement were 
assessed using benefit cost analysis (BCA). 
The report assesses the effects of enforcing current fishery policies more stringently. It 
finds that a substantial investment [PHP 614,000 (USD 11,500) per year] would be 
required to ensure compliance with regulations and that the benefits of achieving high 
levels of compliance would exceed costs by only a tiny margin. The situation would be 
transformed into one in which increasing number of people would continue to fish, 
expending larger amounts of effort to comply with various gear restrictions but, in all 
likelihood, harvesting fewer fish. Catch per unit effort (CPUE) and marginal 
productivity would decrease because the bay is already overfished. Any additional 
fishing effort in the bay will result in a decrease in the average catch of all fishermen. 
Enforcement of current policies will not address the underlying problems of open access 
and overfishing. 
One policy to deal with the problems of open access and overfishing is to set a limit on 
the total number of fish that can be caught and divide this quota among Lamon Bay’s 
fishermen. Over time, the total allowable catch might be reduced. The easiest way to 
make the initial reductions would be to revoke the permits of fishermen who contravene 
fishing regulations, for example, with regards to the permissible catch size or seasons. 
To allow flexibility, the quotas allocated to individual fishermen may be tradable. This 
system of individual tradable quotas or permits has been very successful in New 
Zealand.  
The typical Lamon Bay fisherman lies below the poverty level. He has almost no 
secondary source of income and finds his household members willing but unable to 
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obtain work. Efforts to reduce overfishing in the bay should therefore be complemented 
with measures to promote alternative sustainable livelihoods.  
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The contribution of fisheries to the Philippine economy is significant. The Philippines 
was the twelfth largest fish producer in the world until the early eighties. In 1998, the 
total fish production from commercial fisheries was 941,000 metric tonnes (mt), 
comprising 35% of the total national commercial fish catch. Municipal fisheries1 was 
34% of the total national municipal fish catch. The rest was attributed to aquaculture 
production (31%). Fisheries provide more than 60% of the edible protein in the country.  
Threatened by overfishing and habitat destruction, municipal fisheries production has 
been declining by 5.4% annually since 1991 (BAS 1993). In 1998, this decreased 
slightly to 4.8%. The rapidly growing population, increased fishing efforts, expansion of 
fishing areas and illegal fishing have caused harvesting to be uneconomical for 
fishermen. Many nearshore and traditional fishing areas of the country are already fully 
exploited with most of the enclosed bays and gulfs overexploited. To address this 
problem, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) implemented several 
administrative orders among which include the establishment of fish sanctuaries in the 
overexploited areas, replanting of mangroves, regulating the use of fine meshed nets in 
fishing and seasonal policies on commercial boats. 
One of the top ten major fishing grounds in the country is Lamon Bay, located in 
Quezon province. It ranked as the fifth highest commercial fishing ground in 1995 with 
a total production of 55,252 mt comprising 6% of the total national harvest. Municipal 
fisheries production in the same year was 41,862 mt or 5% of the total, thus, making it 
the ninth major municipal fishing ground in the country. However, since 1985, its fish 
catch has been declining at the rate of 13.5% per annum which is more than twice the 
national average of 5.4%. Thus, the need for local policies was realized.  
Republic Act No. 8550 or the 1998 Fisheries Code was enacted to provide for the 
development, management and conservation of fishery and aquatic resources. It 
specifically considered the protection of the rights of fishermen in the preferential use of 
municipal waters. It provides a wider area of operation - that is 15 km from the coastline 
- for municipal and small scale fishermen using fishing boats of three gross tonnes or 
less, in order to increase their CPUE. The Code follows the implementation of Fisheries 
Administrative Order No. 156 which extended the area of operation of municipal 
fishermen to 7 km from the original 3 km stipulated in the Presidential Decree No. 704.  
With the empowerment of the local government units (LGUs) through the Local 
Government Code of 1991, several local/municipal ordinances are concurrently being 
implemented with the Fisheries Code in Lamon Bay. These include banning of electric 
shiners or incandescent lights with wattage ranging from 200 to 1,000 per bulb and 
                                                 
1 The term “municipal fisheries” refers to fish catch from boats of 3 gross tonnes or less, or uses gear not 
requiring the use of boats. The term “coastal or municipal waters” includes streams, lakes and tidal waters 
within the municipality as well as marine waters with the seaward boundary running along a line three 
nautical miles from the shoreline. This was later extended to 15 km from the shoreline by the Local 
Government Code of 1991, and as also provided for in the Fisheries Code of 1998. 
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powered by dynamo, and regulating the use of fish cages. Moreover, a resolution on 
seasonal closure for gathering milkfish fry has been forwarded to the municipality of 
Infanta, Quezon.  
Electric shiners are used by fishermen to attract fish at night. These devices also attract 
smaller fish including fry that have not grown to harvestable size. On the other hand, the 
proliferation of fish cages destroy the breeding grounds of milkfish which also serve as 
sanctuary for milkfish fry in times of bad weather. A moratorium on catching/harvesting 
of milkfish fry for two years was endorsed by the LGUs. Also known as closed season 
for milkfish fry harvesting, this was proposed to allow the fry of other fish species to 
grow since they were also caught with the same gear used by the milkfish fry gatherers 
but thrown away because there were no buyers. This has affected the catch of other 
municipal fishermen. The aforementioned policies may be referred to as an “initial 
policy set”.  
In spite of these developments in fishery regulations both at the national and local 
levels, no study has been conducted to determine their effectiveness and efficiency, 
particularly in Lamon Bay. No study has evaluated the changes that have occurred 
under the different fishery policies to show that the targets and objectives of the policies 
have been achieved.  
This study was undertaken to evaluate the economic benefits and costs of implementing 
various fishery policies and the changes in fisheries resource quality. At the same time, 
it also considered the institutional effectiveness and efficiency of the system in the 
current situation and future scenarios. This study serves as a tool for recommendations 
relevant to municipal fishery policies formulation in Lamon Bay and in other coastal 
sites. 
2.0 OBJECTIVES  
Research Objectives 
The general objective of this research was to use economic evaluation in assessing 
fishery policies that can be implemented in Lamon Bay.  
The specific objectives of this research were to: 
 Evaluate some of the existing local fishery policies; 
 Assess the changes in benefits and costs of municipal fishermen using different 
fishery policies;  
 Evaluate the changes in fisheries resource quality of the area using different fishery 
policies;  
 Determine the major factors that influence trends in fishery catch under different 
fishery policies, using a bioeconomic model; 
 Identify and assess the capability of the local institutional mechanism used in the 
different policies; and 
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 Recommend further enhancements, where necessary, to the fishery policies 
considered. 
3.0 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Effective March 1998, all fishery ordinances/policies at the local/municipal and national 
levels are superceded by Republic Act 8550 upon the approval of President Fidel 
Ramos. It extends municipal waters to 15 km from the coastline to protect municipal 
and small fishermen from commercial fishermen. The integrated coastal resource 
management plan under the Fisheries Sector Program of the Department of Agriculture 
(DA) indicated that the poor condition of local fishermen is aggravated by violations of 
existing policies like the intrusion of commercial fishing boats into municipal waters 
(DA 1992). Thus, aside from the new Fisheries Code, local ordinances have been 
implemented as management intervention for the preferential use of municipal waters.  
Lamon Bay is defined as “Polillo Strait and a portion of Lamon Bay refers to that body 
of marine waters - beginning at Descada Point part of General Nakar, Quezon province; 
traversing the coastline of Real, Infanta and General Nakar to the point of beginning - 
totalling 300,000 ha”  
However, this study concentrated only on the municipal waters of Infanta, Real and 
Polillo because of the unstable peace and order condition in the other municipalities.  
The following are the existing local fishery ordinances in the said municipalities:  
Resolution (Res) No. 1 (1998) of Infanta calls for the seasonal closure of milkfish fry 
gathering for two years. This was formulated upon the request of municipal fishermen 
whose catch is affected by milkfish fry gatherers. Milkfish fry is gathered by municipal 
fishermen and sold to milkfish fishpond owners. The milkfish fry is either sold to 
breeders or cultured and grown to a harvestable size for human consumption. During the 
gathering process, fry of other fish species are also caught and eventually thrown away. 
The complainants claim that this practice has contributed to the increasing mortality of 
other fish species in the fry stage.  
In order to increase their fish catch at night, some fishermen have resorted to using 
electric shiners to attract fish. Electric shiners are fishing boats equipped with 200 to 
1,000 watts incandescent lights powered by a dynamo. This technology is prohibited in 
municipal waters because the light also attracts smaller fish that are not yet harvestable. 
Municipal Ordinance (MO) No. 09 (1996) in Infanta states that electric shiners are 
allowed in municipal waters provided that no more than four bulbs of 200 watts each 
per fishing boat is used. Coleman/Petromax lamps of more than six units per fishing 
boat shall not be allowed in municipal waters except for research purposes only. 
In 1997, MO No. 001, also known as “Demolition of Fish Cages Ordinance”, declared 
fish cages “saplad and baklad” (fish coral) as illegal structures affecting small 
fishermen by reducing their fish catch and income. These structures destroy the 
breeding grounds of milkfish which also serve as sanctuary for milkfish fry in times of 
bad weather. 
Both municipalities of Real and Polillo had set aside areas for santuary and prohibition 
of fishing within the established sanctuaries to protect fisheries and aquatic resources. 
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Infanta had approved MO No. 4 (1999) limiting mesh size to 3 cm to allow fish fry to 
mature before harvesting.  
An economic evaluation of the aforementioned policies was conducted to come up with 
recommendations for further enhancements, where necessary, of such fishery policies. 
Economic evaluation is a technique used by decision-makers in the management of 
scarce resources. The goal of this study is to apply economic evaluation to different 
policies in order to determine which alternative will reduce or counteract adverse effects 
of coastal fisheries. To this end, such effects and measures were expressed in specific 
physical terms using BCA to come up with economic efficiency indicators like benefit 
cost ratio (BCR), internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV). Economic 
evaluation of different resource management options has been used in several studies on 
coastal resources. Bishop et. al. (1987) used economic evaluation as a decision-making 
tool in the use of the Great Lakes as a recreation site in the United States of America. 
Cruz (1986), in using economic evaluation to determine the optimum coastal policies 
for San Miguel Bay, revealed that out-migration for alternative sources of income to 
fishing should be sufficient to offset rapid population growth in the coastal 
communities. Campos (1997) used economic evaluation as an ex-ante evaluation of 
seasonal policies for Calauag Bay. The results showed that seasonal policies would 
further increase the income of municipal fishermen, productivity of the bay and improve 
fisheries resource quality. 
In government programs and policies where coordination among LGUs, non-
government organizations (NGOs), people’s organizations (POs) and different sectors 
of society are involved, analysis of institutional arrangements is now used as a tool for 
policy formulation and recommendations with the objective of learning from the past 
(PNOC 1994). This was done through the policy guidelines for risk management of the 
Leyte Geothermal Plant. The indicators of institutional capability were based on the 
components of the guidelines, adaptation of the implementors and stakeholders, hazards 
encountered, structural measures, non-structural measures, emergency response, 
breakdown prevention, restoration, damage assessment and rehabilitation. Thus, 
identification and assessment of  the local institutional mechanism with and without the 
implementation of seasonal policies were covered in this study. Emphasis was on the 
preparedness of the local institutional mechanism, the number and capability of the 
manpower complement, physical and financial resources as well as awareness of 
implementors on seasonal policies. Furthermore, the analysis focused on the mandated 
(legislated) vis-à-vis the actual functions as well as the issues, gaps and constraints of 
the institutional mechanisms under consideration. 
There are no previous studies done or existing researches being conducted on the impact 
of Republic Act 8550 on Lamon Bay. Related researches are as follows:  
The Rapid Resource Ecological Assessment conducted by Hayuma Foundation in 1995 
and 1999 in the Real and Infanta portions of Lamon Bay identified the fish species 
found in the area. Although the outputs of these studies are statistics on fisheries and 
resource assessment, no attempt was made to relate the trends with and without fishery 
policies to fisheries resource quality. Fisheries resource quality is the extent of variation 
in the number of species in a given ecological area. In this study, the change in fisheries 
resource quality was measured by comparing the number of fish species with and 
without the existence of fishery policies. Primary data on fish catch (volume and value) 
by species and by type of boat which were gathered during the course of this study and 
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the results of the monitoring done by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturists (OMAs) 
in Infanta, Real and Polillo were used in the computation and analysis of changes in 
fisheries resource quality.  
In Lamon Bay, the environmental benefits and costs of monitoring and implementing 
different fishery policies were analyzed using a bioeconomic model. This methodology 
was used by Campos (1997) for Calauag Bay wherein the technological factors 
identified were type of fishing gear used (e.g. baby bagnets), fishing policies or 
management intervention (whether or not to impose seasonal policies). Technological 
factors are considered as controls since they allow the resource managers to decide on 
what impact/effect they want on the fishery resource. The biological aspect was 
conducted by comparing growth (length of the fish during recruitment), natural 
recruitment weight and natural mortality. However, this study used the number of fish 
species, recruitment size and fishing effort (or number of fish catch per fishing trip), as 
primary data taken during the survey. The socioeconomic factors used in the Calauag 
study include input costs and output prices. These were taken from the said survey. 
Other socioeconomic factors that were analyzed in this study are change in income and 
productivity within the bay. Data on income as well as on productivity measure or 
volume of fish catch were also taken from the same survey.  
Both biological and economic units are included in models of fishery economics. The 
biological unit consists of a growth function relating natural growth (reproduction plus 
individual growth minus mortality) to the fish population size or fish stock. On the other 
hand, the economic unit consists of the relationship between output (catch) and inputs 
(fishing effort) known as the production function. 
The advantage of an economic evaluation study over technical studies like resource and 
ecological assessment is that the layman appreciates it more because it expresses a 
variety of impacts in a common unit of measurement - a currency value. This allows 
tradeoffs to be more clearly seen and weighed. It is only when the technical studies have 
been translated into monetary terms that they can be appreciated by the general public. 
In short, an economic evaluation can only be conducted after a technical study e.g. an 
ecological assessment has been done. Furthermore, the results can be used as a tool in 
policy formulation and recommendations to the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 




The following are the hypotheses of the study: 
 The implementation of fishery policies has improved the fisheries resource quality 
of the area. 
 Fishery policies have increased the productivity and income of fishermen. 
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 The total number of sustenance fishermen affected by a particular fishery policy, the 
type of fishing gear employed by the fishermen and the average price by fish species 
are the factors which determine the fishing effort in Lamon Bay.  
 The local institutional mechanism requires further capability building assistance to 
implement the different fishery policies. 
Two existing fishery policies scenarios: (1) banning the use of electric shiners; and (2) 
regulating the use of fish cages, were covered in this study under Republic Act 8550. 
Moreover, the resolution on the seasonal closure for gathering milkfish fry was included 
in the study.  
4.2 Research Methodology 
This research covers four aspects: economic, fisheries resources quality, institutional 
assessment and policy analysis. 
4.2.1 Policy Aspect 
Review of Existing Policies 
After identifying and gathering all relevant, existing national and municipal policies, 
local executives and stakeholders were interviewed to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of these policies.  
Policy Analysis 
Effectiveness was measured by comparing the objectives and targets of the policies with 
the outputs. In this case, meeting the objectives of providing municipal and small scale 
fishermen with a wider area to operate fishing boats of three gross tonnes or less as well 
as to increase their CPUE. The results of the fisheries resource quality were also used in 
this component. An increase in CPUE is an indication of improved fisheries resource 
quality. Aside from this, improved fisheries resource quality occurs hand in hand with 
an increase in the size of fish catch and in the number of fish species harvested. 
Acceptability of the policy from the point of view of stakeholders (municipal fishermen, 
traders, policy implementors) was also analyzed.  
Efficiency was analyzed by comparing the costs of implementation (including transfer 
costs) on the part of the LGUs, the Coast Guard, BFAR and other entities with the 
benefits of the policy to different stakeholders. This was taken from the BCA of the 
Economic Aspect of the study. Regulatory provisions were evaluated for functionality 
and pragmatism. Review of other related policies was done in order to determine the 
gaps and constraints as well as conflicting provisions.  
The output of the Economic Aspect on the socio-economic profile of households of 
municipal fishermen was utilized as inputs to possible alternative livelihood projects for 
municipal fishermen (e.g., milkfish fry gatherers) in the area. Key informant interviews 
were conducted in the Institutional Assessment of this study to evaluate the 
acceptability of various fishery policies. 
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4.2.2 Fisheries Resource Quality 
Inventory of Fishermen 
An inventory of fishermen was conducted since the data from the LGUs was incomplete 
and needed updating. A survey of fishermen was also conducted by the Infanta 
Integrated Community Development Assistance, Inc. (ICDAI) and Cope Foundation, 
both NGOs, in 1995, but this does not tally with the inventory taken by the LGUs. For 
each coastal barangay (or village) covered, complete enumeration of each type of 
fishing gear was done. This involved listing down the names of all fishermen in the 
barangay and the fishing gear/s they own or co-own. Additional information pertaining 
to seasonality of use(for example, the months the gear is used, number of trips per year) 
was also gathered. Estimates of the number of units by gear type for Lamon Bay was 
obtained by summing up the estimates in each barangay. The seasonality of use - 
number of trips per year - by gear type was obtained by averaging all responses.  
Fish Landing Survey 
Daily fish landing survey for 10 months from November 2000 to August 2001 was 
conducted to provide inputs for the Bioeconomic Model (discussion is in the following 
section). The original plan was to collect data from strategic fish landing stations in 
each municipality: Infanta, Real, and Polillo. However, during the reconnaissance 
survey, it was discovered that municipal boats do not go to the fish landing ports where 
commercial fishing boats go. Instead, they dock near their houses so that there are as 
many fish landing points as there are municipal fishing boats.  
Fish landing data on price and volume of fish catch was collected which is equivalent to 
the farmgate price (for agricultural products) being the point of first sale. Municipal 
boats carry only one passenger (the operator) so it is impossible for the researcher to 
join the fishing trips. Information on monitoring landings by gear type, species 
composition of the catch, gear design and dimensions, as well as area and time of 
operations were instead gathered at the fish landing points. 
Criteria for the selection of the municipal fishing gears were based on the following: (1) 
target beneficiary of a particular fisheries policy; (2) frequency of use or popularity 
among fishermen; (3) relative contribution to fish production; (4) gear efficiency; (5) 
potential impact on resource sustainability; (6) use in or near a critical habitat of 
interest; and (7) accessibility to periodic monitoring. The sample size was obtained 
using the Sample Size Calculator developed by Creative Research Systems 
(http://www.surfeysystem.com/sscalc.htm).  
Bioeconomic Model 
A bioeconomic model was used to compute fish catch by fishing gear and by fish 
species. The catch/ yield was used as input to the BCA of the Economic Aspect of this 
study.  
The model incorporates both biological and economic units which are included in 
models of fishery economics. The biological unit consists of a growth function that 
relates natural growth to fish population or stock. Natural growth is computed as 
reproduction plus individual growth minus mortality. 
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G = G(X); G(X) >/< 0 for X >/< K, لG/لX >/< 0   (1) 
For X >/< maximum sustainable yield, 2لG/لX2  < 0 throughout 
Where G = natural growth measured in weight of biomass 
X = fish stock also measured in weight of biomass 
K = natural equilibrium stock or carrying capacity of the environment 
The economic unit consists of the relationship between output (catch) and input (fishing 
effort) known as the production function: 
Y = j (E); لjj/لE> 0, 2لj/لE2  < 0   for X =¯x    (2) 
This equation implies that, for any given X, the larger the effort (E), the greater is the 
catch (Y). Conversely, for any given E, the larger the fish stock, the greater is the catch: 
Y = r(X); لr/لX > 0, 2لr/لX2  < 0,   for E = E    (3) 
If we combine equations (2) and (3), the fishery production function is: 
Y = F(E,X); لF/لE> 0, 2لF/لX2  > 0, لF/لE< 0, 2لF/لX2  < 0,  (4) 
The fish stock (X) in the fishery production function (5) is assumed to be constant (X 
=X) and eliminated from the equation as an explanatory factor of variations in catch, 
hence, 
Y = f (E,X)        (5) 
Fishing effort is itself an output of various fishing input or it is a composite input that 
can be broken down into its component elements such as capital and labor. Capital is 
represented by number of boats and fishing gear while labor is represented by 
population and number of fishermen. The fishermen or fishing units produce effort and 
each fisherman's catch depends not only on his own effort but also on the effort applied 
on the given fish stock by fellow fishermen. 
Similarly, an increase in fish prices - without any change in costs - would induce entry 
into the fishery until all profits are dissipated. Changes in fish prices occur as a result of 
shifts in the supply or demand for fish. With a given demand, poor catch would lead to 
an increase in price and higher catch to a fall in price. With a given supply, increasing 
demand (due to population growth or increasing income) would lead to increase in fish 
prices. Catch rises in the short run but falls in the long run if the fishery is biologically 
overexploited. Daily or seasonal fluctuations or prices may or may not affect the 
equilibrium level of effort depending on the level of exit and re-entry (including the 
availability of alternative employment for labor and capital). 
Combining the above elements will produce catching power so that 
E = j( POP, FMEN, FTECH, PR)     (6) 
Where  E  = the fishing effort which can be in the form of labor and capital input  
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POP = population in the fishing community 
FMEN = total number of sustenance fishermen affected by a particular fisheries 
policy such as regulation of milkfish fry gatherers, ban of electric shiners, and 
ban on fish cages 
FTECH = level of  fishing technology  which includes hook and line, multiple 
hook, and gill net 
PR   = average price of a fish species in PHP/kg 
The aforementioned model was run for the three policy scenarios. Cross section data on 
E, POP, FMEN, PR and FTECH taken from the daily monitoring survey were in the 
model.  
The hypothesized values of the partials are: 
 POP > 0 An increase in the population of the Lamon Bay watershed willل/jjل
increase fishing effort since the main livelihood of the people in 
the coastal areas is fishing. Fishing is an open access livelihood, 
which makes it the primary source of income in the area. Aside 
from this, fish is the major source of protein in the coastal 
villages. 
 FMEN >0 An increase in the number of fishermen will increase the rate of ل/jjل
resource extraction in terms of manpower. 
 FTECH > 0 A direct pressure on the fishing effort will be caused by anل/jjل
increase in the rate of resource extraction (number of boats). 
 PR >0 An increase in the price of fish will increase the rate of resourceل/jjل
extraction.  
In an overexploited natural resource system, continuous exertion of efforts through 
increase in population, sustenance fishermen and boats in operation as well as 
unregulated fishing would likely result in a declining output. Increasing prices, on the 
other hand, would enable the fishermen to double their effort to catch more fish. 
However, with an exploited resource, stock would become extinct.  
Assessment of Fisheries Resource Quality  
Indicators of improved fisheries resource quality are increased fish catch and number of 
fish species caught, and decreased fishing effort in the regulated area. Decreased fishing 
effort in the regulated area will give time for the new stock to grow until the next 
fishing season. The results of the fisheries monitoring conducted by the OMAs of Real, 
Infanta and Polillo, and by BFAR in 1995 and the daily fish monitoring conducted by 
this project were used.  Increase in fish catch, number of fish species caught and fishing 
effort during the different scenarios (before and during implementation of the policies) 
were computed and analyzed. CPUE was computed as the number of fish caught 
divided by the time it takes to make one fishing trip. 
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4.2.3 Economic Aspect 
Data Collection 
A survey of 450 sample municipal fishermen in Infanta, Real and Polillo was 
conducted. From the list of fishermen in each municipality, 150 samples were randomly 
chosen. Using a structured questionnaire, information on the cost of operation and 
income of the fishermen for the year 2000 was generated, including their socio-
demographic profile, perceptions and production or level of fish catch, as well as daily 
fish prices by species from September 2000 to June 2001. The survey period captured 
the lean months (October-January), peak months (March-August) and spawning period 
(April-June) in Lamon Bay. Results of the survey were used in the BCA for the 
implementation of selected fishery policies in Lamon Bay, particularly in the 
computation of economic efficiency indicators. Due to errors in the list of fishermen in 
the three municipalities, a validation of respondents with village officials and/or PO 
leaders was made prior to the conduct of the survey in the sample barangays. This 
procedure was done to ensure that the respondents are residents of their respective 
villages. With the validation, some respondents had to be replaced right away as many 
of them have migrated to another area, a few have died while others are not residents of 
the particular village.  
To complement the survey data, information from secondary sources was also taken. 
These include the list of municipal fishermen which was taken from the respective 
OMA of the three towns covered. Additional information was gathered in two 
barangays (i.e., Sibulan, Polillo and Ungos, Real) and ICDAI. This information was 
used primarily for the sampling of respondents. 
Method of Analysis 
BCA of the different fishery policies in the following scenarios: a) no regulation and b) 
with regulation (low and high levels of implementation and monitoring) from the point 
of view of the municipal fishermen was done. Levels of implementation and monitoring 
are dependent on the budget allotted by LGUs. The results of the survey on fishermen 
and key informant interviews as well as the results of the bioeconomic model of the 
Fisheries Resource Quality Aspect of this study were used in the computation of 
economic efficiency indicators. Economic efficiency indicators are used in comparing 
alternative investments, in this case, with and without seasonal policies. These 
indicators include the IRR, NPV and BCR. Comparison of measures of economic 
efficiency was done after computing the above.  
4.2.4 Institutional Aspect 
The following procedures and methods were used to gather and analyze data in the 
conduct of the study: 
Data Collection 
A reconnaissance survey was conducted to identify the existing institutional 
mechanisms that are being utilized to implement various fishery policies in the 
municipalities of Infanta, Real and Polillo. This activity required an ocular inspection of 
the area, collection of relevant data and information from various offices as well as 
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interviews with some key informants from the concerned LGUs, NGOs and the 
fishermen. 
Existing records from concerned government offices involved in the implementation of 
fisheries policies were reviewed. These materials served as relevant background 
information for the development of the research instruments for the study. Key 
informant interviews were conducted using interview guides for the different local 
institutional mechanisms.  
Method of Analysis 
The 7S McKenzie Framework and the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
(SWOT) analysis were used to assess the capability of the existing local institutional 
mechanisms to implement fishery policies. The different aspects considered in the 7S 
McKenzie Framework are as follows: 
1.  Structure – composition, functions, physical, financial and manpower resources, 
linkages with other organizations; 
2. Systems working within the organization – information system, monitoring and 
evaluation system, rules and policies on members; 
3.  Style – leadership within an organization, characteristics of the leadership; 
4.  Staff - number and qualifications of the staff upon entry, description of work, 
level of awareness of local policies; 
5.  Skills – skills of the existing manpower complement, relevant trainings before 
entry, relevant on-the-job trainings attended, plans for staff development; 
6.  Strategy – approaches used to meet the vision, mission and goals; and  
7. Superordinate Goal – assessment of the collective sum of the six plus the shared 
values of the staff towards the attainment of Vision, Mission and Goals. 
SWOT. The SWOT Analysis was done for following functional institutional 
mechanisms: the Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management Council 
(MFARMC) and OMA. SWOT analysis was not done for Infanta Bantay Dagat and 
Bantay Polillo since these mechanisms were no longer in existence at the time of the 
study. The SWOT analysis is presented (Table 6) taking into consideration the internal 
strengths and weaknesses as well as the external opportunities and threats of the 
MFARMC and OMA in the execution of fishery policies.  
5.0 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY AREA 
5.1 The Study Area 
Lamon Bay, 160 km south of Manila, is located in Quezon province (Figure 1). The 
municipalities of Lamon Bay included in this study are: Infanta and Real - situated in 
the mainland of Quezon province - and Polillo part of the Polillo Islands. 
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Figure 1 Location of Lamon Bay, Quezon, Philippines. 
 
Infanta 
Infanta - one of the oldest towns in Quezon province - is situated in the northern part of 
the Quezon mainland, lying along the coast of the Pacific Ocean and facing the island 
municipalities of Polillo. The town has 36 barangays with six located in coastal areas. 
The total land area is 34,276 ha. It has a coastal area of 490 ha, a tidal flat of 3,548 ha 
and a relatively huge mangrove area of approximately 3,000 ha.  
Real 
Real, with a total land area of 56,380 ha, is located in the northern part of Lamon Bay. 
Majority (10) of its 17 barangays are situated along the coastline stretching up to 22 km.  
Polillo 
Polillo is the major municipality in the Polillo group of islands. The strong political will 
of the mayor of Polillo has made fishing along municipal waters strictly for municipal 
fishermen only unlike in Infanta and Real. However, no study has been conducted on 
the fish production and policy implementation in the area. 
5.2 Fisheries Resource Quality  
5.2.1 Fishery Productivity 
Lamon Bay, one of the traditional fishing grounds in the Philippines, has a total of 108 
fish species. The most prevalent fish in the bay are Nemyptherus bathybus and 
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comprise 33% of the total municipal fish catch in the bay. Of these, 22% or 89 mt per 
hectare are caught annually by hook and line (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Most Common Fish Species Caught in Lamon Bay, 2001.  
 
Scientific Name Common Name Local Name 
Ablennes hians Flat needlefish Salasa 
Anampses 
caeruleopunctatus Wrasse Maming 
Arule mate Yellow tail scad Kalapato 
Auxis thazard  Frigate tuna Tulingan  
Caranx ignobilis Giant trevally Banlog  
Caranx sexfaciatus Bigeye trevally Pipikat / Talakitok / Sibo 
Caranx spp. Trevally Talakitok 
Cephalophosis spp. Rockcod Sibungin / Lapu-lapu 
Decapterus maruadsi Round scad Galungggong 
Elagatis bipinnulatus Rainbow runner Salmon 
Epheniphelus spp. Grouper  Lapu-lapu 
Leiognathus equulus Common ponyfish Sapsap 
Lethrinus harak Thumbprint emperor Bukawin 
Loligo spp. Squid Pusit / Nucos 
Lutjanus fulvus Flame colored snapper Maya-maya / Pula / Dapak 
Mugil cephalus Flat gray mullet Banak 
Nemyptherus bathybus Yellowbelly thread fin bream Bisugo / Saray / Gunggong 
Parupeneus spp. Goat fish Salmonite  
Priacanthus spp. Bigeye  Pahak 
Rastrelliger kanagurta Indian mackerel Burao / Alumahan 
Sardinella spp. Sardine Tamban 
Scarus spp. Parrotfish Bunhak / Loro 
Selar spp. Oxeye / Big eye scad Matambaka 
Siganus canaliculatus Rabbitfish / Spinefoot Balawis / Samaral 
Spyraena spp. Barracuda Batig 
Stolephorus spp. Anchovies Bolinao / Dilis 
Terapon jarbua Therapon Bugaong 
Thunnus albacares Yellow fin tuna Tambakol  
Trichiurius lepturis Largehead hairtail Espada 
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A comparison of the length and exploitation rate of common fish species caught in 
Lamon Bay and other coastal areas in the Philippines is shown in Table 2. The 
asymptotic length of the fish is measured from the snout to the tail during recruitment. 
Exploitation rate is the ratio of fishing mortality during recruitment to the total mortality 
which is the sum of recruitment and natural mortality. Exploitation rate ranging from 
0.3 to 0.5 suggests that the stocks are exploited optimally (Gulland 1971 and Pauly 
1984). The results showed that the stock for Sardinella spp is optimally exploited 
(0.42). This means that there is overexploitation of the fish in the area with the 
exception of Sardinella spp because it is reduced to a point that they may no longer 
reproduce fast enough to maintain current population. The length analysis shows that 
those caught in Lamon Bay have the shortest recruitment size among the localities 
surveyed by the University of the Philippines-Marine Science Institute (UP-MSI).  
 
Table 2 Comparison of Growth and Exploitation Rate Parameters for Several 
Species Occurring in Lamon Bay with Other Philippine Stocks, 2001.  
 
Species/Locality Length (Cm) 
Exploitation Rate  
(Per Year) 
Nemyptherus bathybus   
Camotes Sea 25.6 0.54 
Moro Gulf 30.0 0.59 
Tayabas Bay 35.0 0.76 
Guimaras Strait 31.0 0.60 
Manila Bay 29.9 0.54 
Lamon Bay 24.4 0.71 
   
Sardinella spp.   
Visayan Sea 13.9 0.69 
Tayabas Bay 13.5 0.64 
Samar Sea 13.6 0.66 
Ragay Gulf 8.2 0.33 
Lamon Bay 7.9 0.42 
   
Selar crumenopthalmus   
Camotes Sea 12.9 0.61 
Visayan Sea 10.2 0.31 
Moro Gulf 11.8 0.46 
Samar Sea 11.5 0.36 
Ragay Gulf 12.1 0.74 
Lamon Bay 10.1 0.78 
   
Caranx sexfaciatus   
Samar Sea 30.2 0.38 
Burias Pass 28.0 0.55 
Ragay Gulf 27.0 0.45 
Manila Bay 25.7 0.53 
Lamon Bay 25.6 0.58 
   
Source: Fisheries Sector Program - REA  
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There is cause for concern that fishing in Lamon Bay is over its sustainable limits. 
Nemyptherus bathybus, Selar crumenopthalmus and Caranx sexfaciatus in Lamon Bay 
all have small length and high exploitation rates compared to those existing in other 
localities which are indications of overfishing in the bay. 
About nine species in Lamon Bay were analyzed for growth and exploitation rates 
(Table 3). Municipal fisheries catch shows over 398 mt were extracted from the bay for 
a period of ten months - November 2000 to August 2001. This provides an estimated 
yield of around 478 mt per year. 
 
Table 3 Length and Exploitation Rates of Common Fish Species in Lamon Bay, 
Quezon, 2001.  
Species Length (Cm) 
Exploitation Rate  
(Per Year) 
Nemyptherus bathybus 24.4 0.71 
Sardinella spp. 7.9 0.42 
Selar crumenopthalmus 10.1 0.78 
Caranx sexfaciatus 25.6 0.58 
Spyraena spp. 13.2 0.65 
Rastrelliger kanagurta 24.5 0.70 
Parupeneus spp. 10.2 0.61 
Ephinephilus pp. 31.2 0.75 
Lethrinus spp. 24.7 0.72 
 
 
The increasing population in the municipalities surrounding Lamon Bay has added to 
the fish pressure in the bay. Together with these developments, municipal fishing gears 
have proliferated.  
Polillo has at least 17 coastal barangays which are actively engaged in the municipal 
fishing industry while Infanta and Real have five and ten, respectively. Of these clusters 
of communities, there are at least 948 fishing vessels known to operate in Lamon Bay. 
Notably 63% (or 596) of the total fishing vessels are hook and line, 15% (or 145) are 
multiple hooks, 14% (or 135) are gill net, while the rest (8% or 72) are a combination of 
the aforementioned. Most of the fishing gears are from Real (414), followed by Polillo 
(350) and Infanta (175). Most of the municipal fishermen use only the simplest 
traditional way of fishing which are hook and line, multiple hooks and gill nets. 
5.2.2 Productivity of Capture Fishery 
Several parameters were used to measure the productivity of the bay by fishing gear and 
species caught. They are volume of fish catch, relative abundance and CPUE. Relative 
abundance is a rough estimate of the population density of a given species. It is 
calculated from the number of individuals of a certain species caught over a certain 
period of time in a particular place, divided by the total of all species in a community. 
The relative abundance of each fish species caught by different gears was obtained by 
getting its proportion (in percentage) relative to the total harvested fish. CPUE is the 
volume of fish caught per unit time in a fishing trip, expressed as kg per hour (Table 4). 
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Table 4 Volume of Fish Catch, Relative Abundance and CPUE by Municipal 
Fishing Gear and by Species, Lamon Bay, 2001.  








Hook and Line Sardinella spp. 58,296.25 21.74  
Selar crumenopthalmus 38,233.40 14.26  
Nemyptherus bathybus 31,066.50 11.59  
Caranx sexfaciatus 24,547.75 9.15  
Spyraena spp. 16,740.15 6.24  
Rastrelliger kanagurta 11,085.60 4.13  
Parupeneus spp. 10,720.55 4.00  
Ephinephilus spp. 8,008.75 2.99  
Lethrinus harak 7,368.05 2.75  
Anampses 
caeruleopunctatus 
6,362.30 2.37  
Lutjanus fulvus 5,565.15 2.08  
Priacanthus spp. 4,350.80 1.62  
Others 45,810.05 17.08  
   Total 215,685.30           100.00 2.27 
     
Multiple hooks Nemyptherus bathybus 40,888.19 43.47  
Auxis thazard  9,568.19 10.17  
Priacanthus spp. 8,297.63 8.82  
Lutjanus fulvus 6,700.81 7.12  
Caranx sexfaciatus 6,361.88 6.76  
Lethrinus harak 4,433.38 4.71  
Thunnus albacares 3,655.81 3.89  
Ephinephilus spp. 2,818.44 3.00  
Parupeneus spp. 2,561.06 2.72  
Decaptherus spp. 1,205.31 1.28  
Others 7,576.25 8.05  
   Total 94,066.95           100.00 0.96 
     
Gill net Sardinella spp. 10,828.69 18.14  
Stolephorus spp. 7,846.88 13.15  
Parupeneus spp. 4,924.13 8.25  
Spyraena spp. 4,770.56 7.99  
Caranx sexfaciatus 3,673.69 6.16  
Leionathus equulus 3,594.38 6.02  
Loligo spp. 2,975.06 4.98  
Siganus caniculatus 2,404.69 4.03  
Megalaspis cordyla 2,387.81 4.00  
Ablennes hians 2,342.25 3.92  
Rastrelliger kanagurta 2,276.44 3.81  
Scarus spp. 1,336.50 2.24  
Others 10,324.13 17.30  
   Total 59,685.21 100.00 9.52 
     All 369,437.46   
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Three types of municipal fishing gears were recorded in the bay: hook and line (or 
"kawil"); multiple hooks (or "kitang") and gill net (or "lambat"). 
Hook and line is the most widely used fishing gear in the locality. One person on board 
a non-motorized boat casts a single hook and line with bait to catch fish. This boat 
usually plies shallow waters compared to those using other fishing gears. The average 
CPUE is 2 kg per hour. The dominant species caught by the hook and line are 
Sardinella spp. (22% relative abundance or 58 mt during the 10-month period of 
monitoring) and  Selar crumenopthalmus (14% relative abundance or 38 mt). More than 
half of the catch from hook and line in Lamon Bay consists of sardines, big eye scad, 
yellow belly threadfin bream, trevally and barracuda. Sardines, which is the most 
prevalent species, peaks harvest during the month of November (11 mt per hectare) and 
subsides by mid- February (1 mt per hectare). Bigeye scad, with the second highest 
relative abundance at 13%, peaks during the month of April (14 mt per hectare) and 
becomes scarce also in mid-February (0.3 mt per hectare). The fish caught in Lamon 
Bay have different peak and lean months of harvest. This shows why the route of hook 
and line fishermen is scattered (Figure 1) since they have to go to other parts of the bay 
where fish are in abundance. 
The high number of fishing boats (596 on the average) which comprises 63% of the 
total municipal fishing boats is an indication of fishing pressure resulting from an 
increase in the fishing community population. In Barangay Dinahican, Infanta, many 
transitory fishermen from faraway places like Bicol and Visayas become informal 
dwellers of the place. They have heard about the bountiful harvest in Lamon Bay only 
to find out when they arrive that they have come for the worst. This is evidenced by the 
high exploitation rate of Lamon Bay and shorter length fish catch compared to other 
bays in the Philippines where some of the transitory fishermen come from. They exert 
pressure on fisheries and other resources of the community. The people in the 
community do not have access to other sources of income in the vicinity. The fish catch 
is so low that it is almost always used for domestic consumption by the fisherman's 
family. The hook and line fisherman often uses at least one other gear because of the 
low catch and seasonality of harvestable fish. He uses other gears to meet the food 
requirements of his family. 
The declining productivity of the bay caused by man's exploitation has prompted the 
fishermen to make use of more innovative fishing implements. One of these is the 
multiple hooks which is a variation of the single hook and line. Multiple hooks range 
from 100 to 1,000 hooks attached to a long line. Upon his return from the sea, the 
fisherman's wife cleans each hook after which she painstakingly attaches bait to each 
hook. This tedious process keeps the wife occupied most of the day. Multiple hooks are 
used by fishermen operating both the motorized and non-motorized boats. Nemyptherus 
bathybus and Auxis thazard comprise nearly half of the total catch (54% or 50 mt) with 
an average CPUE of 1 kg per hour. The common species that are caught by hook and 
line and multiple hooks are the yellowthread fin bream, thumbprint emperor, grouper, 
flame colored snapper, goat fish and the big trevally. The peak months for harvesting 
fish species like thumbprint emperor, flame colored snapper and goat fish using both the 
fishing gears are in March, January and November respectively. May is the lean month 
for catching yellowthread fin bream, also using both fishing gears. No goat fish nor 
thumbprint was caught in February using hook and line. 
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The gill net traps fish through entanglement of the operculum and gills against the net. 
Two types of gill net that are commonly used in the area are the drift and the bottom set 
net. Two persons on board a motorized or non-motorized boat deploy the net and 
retrieve them 3 to 4 hours later. The average CPUE is 10 kg per hour. The dominant 
species caught by the gill net are Sardinella spp (18% relative abundance or 11 mt) and 
Stolephorus spp. (13% or 8 mt). Electric shiners are not operated by fishermen using 
hook and line but by those using multiple hooks and gill nets. 
Milkfish fry gathering is practiced along the coastline of Infanta during the spawning 
months of March to October. The gatherers walk in pairs, one person holding either side 
of the net, to traverse the stretch of the coastline. The net catches milkfish fry and other 
juvenile fishes. At the end of the walk, the pair scoop the milkfish fry with their bare 
hands and place them in containers while culling the unwanted juvenile fish. If the size 
of the fish is too small for home consumption or for sale, these are either returned to the 
sea or thrown in the sand. The mortality rate of the culled fish is very high. Res No. 1 
(1998) of the Municipality of Infanta bans gathering of milkfish fry for two years. 
During the monitoring months of March to August 2001, about 15 million pieces of fry 
were gathered. However, the culled fish as well as other juvenile fishes caught were 
unaccounted for. These could have commanded a higher price if they were left to grow 
to maturity. 
Three fish cages were found in the cove between the boundary of Infanta and Real with 
1 mt harvest. MO No. 1 (1997) orders the demolition of illegal fish cages. 
The average productivity per boat per fishing trip has been declining. In 1965, it was 
about 2 kg for the hook and line and 52 kg for the gill net. Ten years later, the figures 
dropped by half - 0.7 kg for hook and line and 19 kg for gill nets, respectively. 
Since 1995, only 23 fishermen using electric shiners were apprehended in Polillo. The 
total annual fish catch of these violators is about 10 mt of fish of varied species.  
Figure 2 The Operation Area of Municipal Fishing Gears, Lamon Bay. 
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MOs No. 5 (1995) and No. 9 (1996) of Polillo and Infanta, respectively ban the use of 
electric shiners. The operation area of the various municipal fishing gears in Lamon Bay 
is shown in Figure 2. 
5.3 Fishing Households 
Most municipal fishermen rely heavily on fishing as a source of income. Only a small 
proportion has a secondary occupation. Majority of their spouses are not employed nor 
engaged in gainful activities despite the fact that they are better educated compared to 
the fishermen. A large percentage of the respondents’ children who belong to the labor 
force - those who are 15 years old and above - are either unemployed or engaged in 
non-gainful activities (for example, helping out their father with the fishing or farming 
activities). It is worth noting that a great number of these children reached high school 
level. This indicates that many members of the municipal fishermen’s households are 
idle and have time to engage in possible employment opportunities (for example, 
livelihood projects) especially since some of these household members are equipped 
with the appropriate educational requirement. 
Some are engaged in crop and livestock/poultry production in order to augment 
household income. However, income from these activities are still low particularly for 
crop production. This is because productivity levels are quite low, at times not even 
reaching the national average.  
Majority of the respondents own the boats they use. Most of these boats are motorized. 
The most common fishing gear used is the hook and line or kawil/biwas, in the 
vernacular while others use the multiple hooks and line or kitang which is more costly. 
Bottom gill nets are often used although some prefer the drift gill nets. 
Fish catch is quite low. Furthermore, harvests are high for fish that command low price 
while the average catch for expensive species are relatively low. Species which have 
high prices are groupers, flame-colored snapper and Spanish mackerel while 
yellowbelly threadfin bream, frigate tuna, round scad and yellow fin tuna are quite 
cheap. This explains why net income from fishing is low, averaging PHP 10,170 (USD 
190). Polillo respondents reported the highest mean income [PHP 16,664 (USD 311)] 
while those from Real suffered a net loss of PHP 8,188 (USD 153). 
Around three-fourths of the respondents in Real lamented they have fishery-related 
problems: decreasing volume of fish catch, incidence of illegal fishing, low fish prices, 
lack of capital, costly fishing gears and net losses. The findings revealed that small 
fishermen in Real incur losses. 
Compounding their problem is the lack of support services. The survey results showed 
that only 14% of the respondents received assistance mostly from government agencies 
and NGOs.  
Credit is another assistance that is inadequate. Less than one-fourth was able to borrow. 
Informal groups such as relatives/friends, private moneylenders, input dealers and 
traders are the major sources of financial assistance. Only a handful of the borrowers 
were able to get loans from formal sources such as banks and cooperatives.  
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Although a large percentage of the respondents are affiliated with POs, many  believe 
that these associations have not been helpful to them. In some instances, the 
organizations are inactive, thus these groups could not serve as channels of support 
services. 
The majority of respondents acknowledged the existence of illegal activities in Lamon 
Bay, foremost of which is dynamite fishing and encroachment of commercial boats 
along the municipal waters. Nevertheless, incidences of violations appear to be most 
rampant in Real and the least in Polillo based on perceptions gathered from the 
respondents. Most respondents claim that violators are non-residents of their respective 
villages. 
Respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of existing local ordinances that aim to 
stop illegal fishing. Three rating scales were used: (a) 1 for very effective; (b) 2 for 
effective; and (c) 3 for not effective. Very few gave a very effective rating while almost 
equal numbers considered the policies as effective and not effective. More respondents 
in Polillo gave a very effective rating while in Real, only one respondent gave this 
rating. Congruently, the majority of respondents in Real felt that their ordinances are not 
effective in controlling illegal fishing.  
To contain the violations, many respondents stressed the need to implement the policies 
strictly. Unity among stakeholders was also highlighted along with the need for a 
sincere attitude among government officials. Sincerity among government executives 
was cited mainly in Real where the effectiveness of existing ordinances to eradicate 
illegal fishing was low. 
6.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Policy Awareness and Perception 
A total of 17 ordinances are being implemented in the study areas. Only one ordinance - 
that of banning dynamite and other means of illegal fishing - is common to all three 
municipalities while ordinances unique to Infanta are fish cage ban and milkfish fry 
gathering. 
Further clustering of the policies yielded three major groupings, namely: (a) 
developmental or environmental quality maintaining; (b) protective or damage 
avoidance; and (c) economic-incentive in nature. One policy implemented in Real, 
Quezon uses economic instruments by providing cash incentives to apprehending 
officers. It was observed that the ordinances were mostly patterned after the traditional 
fishery resource management approach covering area restriction, catch limitation, 
closed season and specification of permissible fishing techniques. In a way, these are 
developmental in nature. 
On the average, 95% of the respondents are aware of fishery policies and ordinances for 
the protection or avoidance of damages to nature such as the use of destructive means 
(dynamite and poison) or active gear (hulbot hulbot or Danish seine). However, 
awareness of the aforementioned illegal fishing related policies ranges an average of 54 
to 83%, due to the fact that these policies: (a) have concrete, adverse and lasting effects 
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on the environment and on their very source of livelihood; (b) are frequently violated; 
and (c) have economic disincentives that are prohibitive. 
The low awareness level of the policies - use of shiners, demolition of fish cages and 
ban on milk fish fry - which ranges from 0.4 to 5.0% is attributed to their less 
observable detrimental effects. These policies have less recall impact to respondents as 
shown by the household survey. 
6.2 Policy Analysis 
Policy analysis usually starts with the description and explanation of how the policies 
came about (determination type or historical) followed by the consequences (impact). 
This process was adopted in the analysis. 
6.2.1 Initiation and Implementation 
Policy Initiative 
The policies were products of local initiatives in recognition of the fact that fishing 
activities are the major source of livelihood of the residents in the coastal areas of 
Infanta, Real and Polillo. These were formulated to protect small and marginal 
fishermen from illegal fishing and unfair competition (ban on electric shiner), provide 
them a wider area within which to operate (regulation on use of fish cages) and address 
the problem of declining fish catch (moratorium on catching of milk fish fry). 
Initiated during the later part of the 1990s (1996-1999) by the fishermen themselves, the 
policies are of varying forms by virtue of the instruments used to enact them. The policy 
on the ban of electric shiner was enacted through a municipal ordinance, fish cage 
regulation policy was enacted through a municipal order while the ban on the gathering 
of milkfish was through a resolution.  
While ban on electric shiners and gathering of milkfish fry addresses related objectives 
of preventing very large volumes of fish being caught in the area which may include 
small fishes and preventing further depletion of fish resources along coastal areas, fish 
cage regulation, on the other hand, aims at removing obstruction to navigable areas and 
illegal structures in mangrove areas. 
Policy implementation was envisioned to be carried out by (a) limiting the number of 
lights that can be used in electric shiners; (b) providing for a grace period of one month 
from the effective date of the ordinance to allow fishermen to transfer fish from fish 
cages to licensed fishponds; and (c) banning milkfish fry gathering for two years. 
Implementation 
A six-year time lag is observed from fishery policy formulation at the national level to 
its adoption at the LGU level. A case in point is Executive Order No. 240 issued in 
April 1995 creating the Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Councils 
(FARMCs). As of this report, the Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resource 
Management Councils (MFARMC) in the three municipalities covered have just been 
organized and are not yet fully operational. 
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LGUs tend to adopt informal procedures in carrying out fishery related activities 
covered by policies formulated at the national level. Of the three municipalities, only 
Polillo maintains official documents as far as fishery resource protection activities are 
concerned. While the Bantay Dagat group was organized in the municipalities of Real 
and Infanta, there are no official documents on the said activities.  
Factors like political will as well as lack of funds and staff tend to be the major full 
operationalization determinants of fishery policies. 
In terms of policy violation, only Polillo has records of apprehensions for illegal fishing. 
A total of 386 cases since 1990 was reported where 23 or 6% fall collectively under 
unauthorized fishing through the use of electric shiner (Sec. 93 of RA 8550).  
Policy implementation problems stem mainly from the lack of political will, graft and 
corruption among the implementors as well as indifference on the part of the 
stakeholders. It is therefore imperative to acquire a deeper knowledge and 
understanding as to their prevalence in supporting any measures aimed at addressing 
such problems.  
The organization assessment framework model in evaluating the capacity of the LGUs 
to plan and implement the policies is related to the institutional mechanism and systems 
present in the study area. Given the state they are in with the exception of the OMA, 
planning functions are overshadowed by organizational concerns. 
6.2.2 Organizational Assessment 
An organization’s capacity to plan and implement policies is a function of its 
operational environment (legal, social and economic context), its motivation (direction, 
coherence of activities and energy displayed), and its capacity to function as expected. 
The LGUs are mandated by law to enforce all fishery laws, rules and regulations. Valid 
fishery ordinances enacted by the municipality/city council were assessed in this regard. 
Operational Environment 
Four institutional mechanisms, namely the MFARMC, OMA, Bantay Dagat and 
Municipal Agriculture and Fisheries Council (MAFC) are legally mandated to 
implement  fisheries  policies. However, it is not the legal basis but more the nature of 
the organization that has a bearing on their performance.  
Of the four, only the OMA has a definite organizational identity by virtue of its being a 
department of the municipal government. As such, its functions are clear with 
corresponding budget allotment. Its employees are tenured leaving no organizational 
structure related impediments to performance. This is supported by the active  
participation of institutions in all three municipalities. The same cannot be said of 
MFARMC, Bantay Dagat and MAFC which are of varying organizational status. The 
MFARMC is either inactive or requires reorganization while Bantay Dagat is inactive. 
Selection of members to the said councils or groups is also a problem. 
The issue on organizational status and membership contributes to their minimal 
recognition as an institutional mechanism for fishery policy implementation giving no 
bite to their functions. Relatives of the Sangguniang Bayan who are caught violating the 
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law by influence peddling is causing a social concern and threatening the organizational 
identity.  
Motivation 
While motivation among members of the institutional mechanisms may be initially 
present, these are gradually being eroded by disappointments brought about by 
organizational dysfunctions, inadequate resources both physical and financial, as well as 
lack of economic incentives for basic participation. Enough motivation is provided by 
the quality of choices for electoral posts who, according to many, are very well 
qualified. These give hope to the constituents that activities will be carried out as 
planned. 
Capacity 
Capacity in terms of number of manpower and readiness to assigned functions are 
problems confronting the MFARMC, Bantay Dagat and MAFC. If ever membership 
issues would have been resolved, the absence of support staff on a regular basis 
(although support groups are available) affects operations. The members should 
undergo training to better equip themselves with their tasks. 
Seven S McKenzie Framework Analysis 
A comparative analysis of the institutional mechanisms is shown in Table 5 using the 7S 
McKenzie Framework. 
Structure 
In terms of structure, the MFARMC is the most represented institutional mechanism. It 
is highly multisectoral as mandated by law. Bantay Dagat has a relatively loose 
membership since this actually depends on who would volunteer. The MAFC gets its 
members from the member NGOs and cooperatives. However, the OMA appears to be a 
more stable mechanism since it is a regular department of the LGU. 
The MFARMC is mandated to perform technical, regulatory and developmental 
functions. MAFC and OMA are mainly involved in the implementation of development 
projects for fishermen. However, Bantay Dagat (together with a composite team 
including the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard) is the sole mechanism 
mandated to apprehend violators of fisheries policies. 
All the institutional mechanisms do not have adequate physical, financial and manpower 
resources to implement either regulatory or development activities on fisheries. 
Motorboats which could be used for monitoring activities are wanting in all the 
organizations mentioned. Except for the OMA (that gets an annual allocation from the 
LGU), all the institutional mechanisms do not have any regular funds to sustain their 
operations. OMA is the only organization that has a regular staff complement with 
proper training, if not the appropriate educational qualifications on fisheries. The 
MFARMC and MAFC are highly dependent on the NGOs for manpower to provide 
technical assistance. 
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There are no clear linkages between the institutional mechanisms and the national as 
well as local government agencies, NGOs and POs. The relationship is mainly on a per 
project or activity basis. 
Systems 
There is neither an information system nor monitoring and evaluation system that is in 
place in any of the institutional mechanisms. In the case of MFARMC though, the DA 
central office is supposed to develop the system for the MFARMCs to operate. 
However, data and information on fisheries (e.g., number of fishermen, production and 
other data) are collected by the OMA when required by the local chief executive as part 
of its regular reporting system. 
Style of Leadership 
All heads of organizations claim to be consultative in leadership style. The leaders 
interviewed said that they sought suggestions from their constituents in the performance 
of operations. It is worth to note here that the Bantay Dagat of Infanta became active 
only during the term of its previous president, whose name can be released upon the 
reader’s request. When the president resigned, Bantay Dagat also ceased to operate. 
Skills 
The members of both the MFARMC and MAFC may be familiar with fishing activities, 
but are not keen on the types or forms of violations that may be committed by 
fishermen. The Bantay Dagat could function more effectively if one of its members is a 
Fish Examiner from the OMA. 
Staff 
Except for the OMA that has its own staff complement, no institutional mechanisms 
have a regular workforce. They are highly dependent on the support of NGOs as well as 
some departments of the LGU for assistance. 
Strategies 
The institutional mechanisms implementing fishery policies work within their mandates. 
However, they are not keen on the formulation of specific strategies to meet the desired 
goals. More often, activities are planned and implemented consistent with the functions 
that they are supposed to perform. 
Super ordinate Goals 
Despite some odds, the operations of MFARMCs are taking off. Activities of the OMA 
as a department of the LGU are currently being sustained. MAFC took over the 
MFARMC’s role as the latter was inactive. On the other hand, Bantay Dagat has ceased 
to exist due to some operational problems and constraints. 
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Table 5 Seven S McKenzie Analysis of the Existing Institutional Mechanisms 
Implementing Fishery Policies in Infanta, Real And Polillo, Quezon 
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Continuation Table 5 
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Summary of SWOT Analysis 
Table 6 presents a summary of the SWOT Analysis of the following institutional 
mechanisms: MFARMC, OMA and MAFC. 
MFARMC 
The strength of MFARMC as an institutional mechanism to implement fisheries policies 
lies in good representation from the fishery sector. In addition, it benefits from the 
technical and other forms of support given by active NGOs in the area. However, the 
organization has some weaknesses to address which are (a) difficulty to sustain 
members due to financial constraints; (b) weak organization at the local or barangay 
level; and (c) lack of financial resources. 
Opportunities for MFARMC include potential linkages with national government 
agencies, LGUs, NGOs, POs as well as foreign donors. Posing a threat among members 
of MFARMCs are the influential people who are involved in illegal fishing activities or 
influence peddling. 
OMA 
OMA has the advantage of having a regular staff complement. However, it has limited 
funds given that it is highly dependent on its LGU allocation. It has insufficient staff 
members to cater to the various support services needed by fishermen in the area. 
As with the MFARMCs, linkages with various organizations pose as an opportunity for 
the OMA. Nonetheless, the opinion that NGOs compete with OMA persists. This is 
perceived as a threat to the OMA as an organization.  
MAFC 
MAFC has very good representation from NGOs and cooperatives. It benefits from the 
assistance given by an NGO actively operating in the area. However, it lacks funds for 
operations as well as skilled people to implement fisheries projects.  
MAFC could take advantage of linking with various organizations (government or non-
government) in performing its functions. A threat to its operations, though, is the 
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Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
MFARMC Good representation from 
the fishing sector 
Difficulty to sustain 
membership due to 
financial constraints 
Linkages with government 
agencies (national and local), 
NGOs, POs, and foreign 
donors, especially for 
financial assistance 
Influential people intervening in 
the apprehension of violating 
fishermen 
Active participation of 
NGOs 
Weak organization at 
the local level 
 Lack of support from LGUs 
 Unsustained financial 
support 
  
OMA With regular staff 
complement 
Limited funds from 
local government 
Linkages with government 
agencies (national and local), 
NGOs, POs, and foreign 
donors, especially for 
financial assistance 
NGOs compete instead of 
complementing OMA 
 Limited staff 
complement to cater 
to the needs of 
fishermen 
 Influential people intervening in 
the apprehension of violating 
fishermen 
MAFC Good representation from 
NGOs and POs 
Limited funds for 
operations 
Linkages with government 
agencies (national and local), 
NGOs, POs, and foreign 
donors, especially for 
financial assistance 
NGOs compete instead of 
complementing OMA 
  Lack of skills among 
members  
 Influential people intervening in 






6.3 Policy Effectiveness 
The attitude of the coastal communities towards marine resources is “open access” 
where anybody can utilize and exploit the bay. Any policy implemented in an “open 
access” territory is bound to fail unless that policy limits the entry of fishermen. 
Moreover, seminars must be conducted to re-orient people’s knowledge from “open 
access” to “common property management”. The number of fishermen in a given 
locality is an important element giving rise to the community-based management 
approach of coastal resources. If communities are allowed to control resources then they 
are able to prevent encroachment or even control the entry of legal or illegal fishermen. 
They may even be empowered to set the limit on the number of fish catch that can be 
allowed.  
While the respondents’ awareness on policies greatly varied, majority perceived that all 
existing policies are slightly effective in as far as protecting the coastal resources are 
concerned. Policies on the establishment of sanctuaries as well as securing of permits 
and licenses were, however, perceived not to be effective.  
The ineffectiveness of the policy on permits and licenses is statistically supported by 
survey results showing that 84% of the respondents are operating without fishing 
licenses. The existence of three license issuing units - the mayor’s office, barangay 
officials and coast guard - and the seeming lack of coordination among them as well as 
the absence of concrete policy guidelines are the root causes of the ineffectiveness of 
the policy. 
In terms of fish CPUE which is also an indication of improved or deteriorating resource 
quality, fish catch monitoring reveals a decrease in catch despite the increase in the 
level of fishing efforts. 
With regards to achieving the policy objective of providing wider fishing grounds, the 
respondents perceived that most ordinances are slightly effective. In fact, the policy on 
banning the use of electric shiners in Polillo is even rated as effective along this 
concern. This perception, however, is not supported by the average productivity 
statistics as declining productivity was recorded. This indicates declining resource 
quality in the bay. 
The foregoing observations, however, cannot solely be attributed to the effectiveness or 
lack of it. There are previous allegations that Lamon Bay is already overfished and 
overexploited even prior to the study. What the study provided is empirical support to 
these allegations. 
No amount of effectiveness of policies geared towards enhancing resource quality - 
particularly sectoral ones like those under study - can facilitate a complete turnaround or 
be hindered by its deterioration when it has already reached its maximum sustainable 
yield. What is required is a more comprehensive management approach that will 
regulate the use of the bay anchored on a definite identification of its purpose. 
Applying the systems approach, the success and failure of the policy implementation is 
dependent on how well the objectives have been articulated to a level appreciated by the 
target beneficiaries including the social, economic and politico-legal dynamics aspects. 
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People behave rationally within their own system of material incentives and social 
organization (Baum and Tolbert 1985). 
In the area studied, the prevalence of the indifferent attitude among the stakeholders is 
initially rooted to the failure of connecting the policy objectives to daily activities or at a 
level easily appreciated. As study results show, respondents are protective of the bay 
and wary of its destruction, it being the source of their livelihood. Complication sets in 
when community dwellers aside from not being aware of the policies’ existence cannot 
also relate to them. This is when the objectives, such as providing them a wider area 
within which to operate and addressing the problem of declining fish catch, are far 
removed from the daily concerns to be appreciated. These objectives are not easily 
translated to meals made available at one’s table.  
Indifference among committed stakeholders are enhanced when efforts exerted fail to 
connect with objective achievement, as in cases of unsuccessful apprehension due to 
premature tipping off, and if apprehended, the uncooperativeness of witnesses to testify, 
and further, if cases have been filed and ready for trial, protection from political and 
well-known personalities or lack of interest by the authorities often lead to delay in 
judicial process or even non-conviction (Figure 3). 
Factors contributing to this problem are the lack of economic incentives and the 
attendant cost of participation involving use of personal funds. Likewise, personal and 
family security risks as well as ostracism by the community as a consequence of tipping 
off or being witness against offenders have also been identified as contributory factors. 
Other contributory factors include unclear policies that encourages graft and corruption. 
The efforts taken to address the cited policy implementation problems would involve 
awareness enhancing policy education, appropriate incentives and cooperation among 
stakeholders as well as sincerity among the policy implementors. These support Baum 
and Tolbert’s view that in dealing with a large number of people where the institution 
cannot command compliance, indirect authorities such as material incentives, gradual 
process of education and persuasion will do the trick. Identification and allocation of 
scarce resources for primary activities should be prioritized over secondary activities 

















































































































































Figure 3 Systems Interaction 
 
6.4 Policy Efficiency 
While the initial intention was to compare the implementation cost of the institutions 
involved, the uncertainty of the fund source or the lack of it made it impossible to do so. 
The most that can be said is that out of the four institutional mechanisms studied, only 
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the OMA has the most investments in terms of a sustained and increasing financial 
allocation as to manpower investment. It has likewise the most investment not in terms 
of number but regularity of assigned staff (two to four), compared to MFARMC, Bantay 
Dagat and MAFC. Given limited funds and  manpower as well as its sustained 
participation in regulatory and developmental fishery activities, policy efficiency is 
showcased by OMA if only for effort and commitment. 
The same cannot be said of the three other mechanisms although patches of efficiencies 
can be glimpsed in terms of good membership representation for MFARMC and  
commendable mandate for Bantay Dagat. 
At the stakeholders level, particularly members of the Bantay Dagat, cost efficiency in 
terms of time and personal funds contributed is achieved only if and when patrolling 
and monitoring lead to apprehensions. More so if it leads to case filing and consequent 
conviction. 
As to BCA, the combined effect on the ban on both shiners and fish cages proved to 
have the most impact in terms of increase in fishermen’s income. Generally, however, if 
compared to no regulation, imposition of the policy has little impact on the fishermen. 
6.5 Policy Impact 
The impact of the policies was determined using the bioeconomic model, the resulting 
yield of which was run into a BCA.  
6.5.1 Estimated Yield Equations  
The preceding discussions showed that fishery production in Lamon Bay is constantly 
declining. This has been blamed on many factors yet the actual effects of each of these 
factors had not yet been determined empirically. This section will help settle the issue 
on the real determinants of the declining productivity of Lamon Bay. Separate analysis 
was done on the different fish species commonly caught by municipal gears like hook 
and line, multiple hooks, and gill nets using the present or existing scenario, including 
regulations (banning of illegal fish cages, seasonal regulation of milkfish fry gatherers, 
banning of electric shiner devices) in order to identify the parameters that would likely 
affect their exploitation. 
The logarithmic transformation of all variables given by a Cobb-Douglas functional 
form and stochastic specification were used to estimate the yield equations. The 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique was used in the estimation which 
explained the change in yield in relation to changes in some of the identified 
parameters. 
Multicollinearity among the independent variables was observed in the initial attempt of 
estimation. Several equations were run and the estimated results were evaluated with 
respect to the statistical significance of individual regression coefficients, the 
hypothesized a priori signs and the R2 values (coefficient of determination) which 






Models were run both for no regulation and with regulation scenarios: ban of electric 
shiners, regulation of fish cages, seasonal regulation of milkfish fry gatherers and 
combined regulation of fish cages and ban of electric shiners. The explanatory variables 
found to have significant effects on fish yield were number of boats in operation and 
price of fish.  
The equations estimated included the following explanatory variables – namely, 
population in the Lamon Bay communities; number of fishermen (affected by milkfish 
fry gathering, by electric shiners and fish cages); number of fishing gears (hook and 
lines, multiple hooks, gill nets) and price of fish (mackerel, barracuda, yellowbelly 
thread fin bream, thumbprint emperor, grouper, flame colored snapper, goatfish, sardine 
and bigeye trevally). 
6.5.2 Fishing Effort 
Fishing effort is negatively related to fish catch which implies that Lamon Bay is 
overexploited. Referring back to the standard economic model of fishery, the coefficient 
shows that Lamon Bay has already reached the maximum sustainable yield. A 100% 
increase in the level of fishing effort did not increase yield for all fishing gears but 
instead resulted in declining fish catch. For the hook and line, the decline in catch is 
45% for mackerel, 40% for barracuda, 22% for yellowbelly thread fin bream, 21% for 
thumbprint emperor, 33% for grouper, 14% for flame colored snapper, 22% for goat 
fish, 24% for sardines and 25% for trevally. In the existing or present scenario, the 
results showed that a 100% growth in the level of fishing effort did not result in a 
corresponding yield in fishing gears as well as fish catch.  
If there is a 100% increase in the level of fishing effort, mackerel catch from gill nets 
would decline by 11%, barracuda (20%), goat fish (14%), sardines (0.2%) and trevally 
(22%). The results are all significant. These estimated values supply the necessary 
information in the calculation of the marginal productivity of the fishing gear. The 
marginal product of the input gill nets on mackerel is negative (-0.14) which means that 
one additional unit of boat using gill net will decrease the fish catch by this amount. All 
these coefficients proved to be significant. This assertion can also be evidenced by a 
decreasing average catch per boat. The same holds true for all other fishing gears and 
fish species. 
In classical economic theory, price is a single valued function of output. An increase in 
the price of the commodity will motivate the manufacturers to produce more of that 
particular good. The results show that the coefficients for prices of fish are all 
statistically significant. This implies that an increase in the prices of the different fish 
species caught incites the fishermen to increase their catch. For hook and line 
fishermen, a 100% increase in the level of fishing effort resulted in declining fish catch. 
6.5.3 General Assessment of Yield Equations 
All equations gave the characteristics of a good fit as evidenced by the consistency 
signs of coefficients, statistical significance of coefficients, high values and high 
coefficient of determination, R2 except for banning of fish cages.  
The log-linear model for fish catch using municipal fishing gears represented the 
existing scenario where regulations had been on hand but with very minimal violators 
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apprehended like 23 electric shiners in the whole Lamon Bay. The yield equation for 
mackerels for instance has a R2 of 0.95 which implies that 95% of the variation in 
mackerel yield is explained by all variables included in the model. The high F-value 
(25.84) connotes that the random impact of unspecified variables is less, therefore, the 
derivation of the curve from straight line is likewise less. [An F-test (Snedecor and 
Cochran 1983) is used to test if the standard deviations of at least two populations are 
equal. The resulting F-value in this study revealed that the results are statistically 
significant]. The same independent variables cause a decline in productivity of other 
fish in Lamon Bay. The presence of the three fish cages are not significant, meaning 
that they are so few that they do not affect yield of other fish species like mackerel, 
barracuda, yellowbelly thread fin bream, thumbprint emperor, grouper, flame colored 
snapper, goat fish, sardines and bigeye trevally. Milkfish is cultured in these fish cages. 
The sardines’ equation gave the best fit of data with a high R2 (0.97) and F value 
(41.98). 
The results of the second model was a regulation scenario for banning of electric 
shiners. The R2 are all significant and high. As in the first model, the presence of fish 
cages remain to be insignificant. The best fit is seen in the yield of yellowbelly thread 
fin bream with F-value of 38.74. 
For regulation of fish cages, the log-linear results are all insignificant with very low R2 
ranging from 0.16 to 0.48. This implies that there are more unexplained variables that 
have been unspecified in the equation. The fish cages in the project site have no impact 
on fish yield in the bay. Besides, they are located in inland waters and involve culture of 
milkfish as compared to the other municipal gears which engage in capture fishery.  
The results for seasonal regulation of milkfish fry gatherers showed that the R2 values 
are high and significant, ranging from 0.73 to 0.99. Only the presence of fish cages 
remain insignificant. 
Combination of regulation of fish cages and banning of electric shiners show very high 
coefficient of determination, R2 ranging from 0.83 to 0.95. The effect of fish cages is 
also insignificant. All significant values are at 1% level of probability.  
6.5.4 Benefit Cost Analysis  
Yield results of the bioeconomic model in the Fisheries Resource Quality Assessment 
were used as inputs to the BCA. Two scenarios were considered: without any regulation 
and with regulation. Regulation called for the following policy options: ban on shiners, 
regulation of fish cages, as well as ban on both shiners and fish cages. Furthermore, in 
imposing these policy options, two levels of investment were looked into: (1) low level 
of enforcement which is the current practice, and (2) high level of enforcement where 
additional investments have to be made. The former refers to the current procedure 
where the LGUs allot a certain amount [PHP 30,000 (USD 560)] for implementation 
and monitoring in order to apprehend violators as attested by the OMA during the key 
informant interview. On the other hand, the second case pertains to the condition 
wherein the LGU will be providing PHP 614,500 (USD 11,470) in order to implement 
the policies fully. This is the proposed budget of the OMA for full implementation 
which is allocated as follows: per diem [PHP 365,000 (USD 6,814)], labor [PHP 54,000 
(USD 1,008)], fuel/oil (PHP 109,500 (USD 2,044)], supplies [PHP 12,000 (USD 224)], 





brought up during the survey as well as in key informant interviews that because of the 
limited funds being utilized in policy implementation and monitoring, the laws hardly 
have any impact at all. Hence, the option of full implementation and monitoring 
(accompanied by the needed resources and additional funds) was also considered in the 
analysis (Table 7). The BCA was done for five years from 2002 to 2006. 
Benefits 
Benefits consist of sales from fish catch which was derived by multiplying price and 
volume of fish catch. Prices were based on the average price per fish species taken 
during the survey. Volume of fish catch for the different scenarios were taken from the 
yield results of the bioeconomic model which has the following explanatory variables: 
human population of the Lamon Bay watershed; number of fishermen affected by a 
particular fisheries policy; number of fishing gears (specified as either milkfish fry 
gatherer, hook and line, multiple hooks, gill nets, electric shiner or fish cage); and 
average price of fish. Yield results varied by scenario since fish regulation would affect 
the number of fishermen and fishing boats plying Lamon Bay. Fish commonly caught in 
Lamon Bay are mackerel, barracuda, yellowbelly thread fin bream, thumbprint emperor, 
grouper, flame colored snapper, goat fish, sardines and trevally.  
Without any regulation 
Without regulation, it is assumed that the apprehended boats and fishermen would still 
be catching fish in Lamon Bay. Municipal records show that the average number of 
apprehensions annually was 39. The yield results of the bioeconomic model for the no 
regulation scenario is 413 mt in 2002 (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 Projected Fish Catch (mt) from Lamon Bay, with and without Regulation, 
2002-2006. 
POLICY YEAR 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
No 
regulation 
413 358 309 267 231 
With 
Regulation 
     
 Shiner ban      
     Low 423 376 335 299 268 
     High 423 432 440 449 458 
  Fish Cage 
ban 
     
    Low 415 360 313 272 236 




     
    Low 424 378 338 303 273 
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With regulation 
In the scenario where regulation is imposed, yield estimates for low level of 
enforcement were based on the present situation where 39 violators were apprehended. 
Under this scenario, three policy options were tested: with ban on electric shiners, fish 
cage regulation, as well as both electric shiners and fish cages.  
For high level of enforcement, it is assumed that all people fishing today would 
continue to fish as long as they purchase individual transferable permits (ITPs) from the 
LGUs. This includes both licensed and unlicensed fishermen. As derived from the 
household survey, at present 84% of the fishermen are operating without permits and 
licenses.  
The proposed ITPs will be issued by the LGUs to resident-fishermen of the three coastal 
municipalities. One ITP is allotted for each fisherman. It is further assumed that the 
existing total number of fishermen shall remain because their number is limited by the 
ITP. No new fisherman can enter the industry unless one with an ITP agrees to sell it to 
him. It is no longer viable to accept another fisherman as revealed by the results of the 
bioeconomic model where the marginal productivity of all fishing gears for all fish is 
declining. This means that an additional unit of boat results in decrease in average catch 
per boat. 
Costs 
Costs include the expenses involved in the implementation of the policy and monitoring 
the bay, plus the expenditures of all fishermen: operating cost of fishing; fuel; oil; ice; 
bait; rental of banca/boat, fishing gear, etc; labor; repair; licenses; mayor’s permit, 
sticker, barangay permit; registration and others. The cost of implementation and 
monitoring is PHP 30,000 (USD 560) under the existing practice while it amounts to 
PHP 614,500 (USD 11,470) at high level of implementation as proposed by the OMA. 
The remaining costs would vary depending on the fishing gear and policy scenario. 
These were taken from the household survey.  
BCA 
Without any regulation 
Without any regulation, fishermen incur losses. In the BCA, it is notable that the NPV is 
negative [PHP 14.6 million (USD 272,541)] as shown in Table 8. The losses could be 
attributed to the declining fish catch in the bay. Accordingly, the BCR is only 0.85 
while the IRR is less than zero. (Indeterminate or zero IRR in this scenario and in the 
succeeding cases are due to the fact that even on the first year of operation, fishermen 
already incur positive net income unlike in most business operations.) This implies that 
with no regulation at all, fishermen are losing income. 
With regulation 
Under this scenario, three policy options were tested: ban on electric shiners, regulations 





Ban on electric shiners 
Low level of implementation. If the local government continues to allot a meager 
amount for the implementation and monitoring of fishery laws, fish catch will continue 
to decline in the area. This scenario of low level enforcement will result in a negative 
net benefit of PHP 10.8 million (USD 201,605), a BCR of 0.89 and a negative IRR. 
Banning shiners alone will not give returns on government’s investment in monitoring 
and implementation. Fishermen’s income will increase slightly than without regulation 
although they still sustain a loss. 
High level of implementation. In contrast, high level of enforcement or provision of 
additional funds in policy implementation and monitoring will yield positive gains. It is 
worth noting that NPV for this condition is PHP 1.4 million (USD 26,134). The BCR is 
1.01 and the IRR, 62%. This is a better deal when compared to the low enforcement 
level. However, the government’s return from its investment does not commensurate 
with the implementation. Fishermen’s income are positive and increasing slightly. 
Fish cage regulation 
Low level of implementation. The results show that  fish cage regulation is not as 
effective as banning shiners. It is worth noting that with the current level of investment, 
there is hardly any difference in NPV, BCR and IRR compared to the results obtained in 
the no regulation scenario. The impact of fish cage regulation is nil since there are only 
three existing in the area which do not affect fishermen’s catch. 
High level of implementation. Pouring in additional funds or high enforcement 
improved the NPV [-PHP 1.2 million (-USD 22,400)] but still the government is not 
getting more out of its investment as shown by the BCR of 1.00 (where benefits are just 
equal to the costs). Fish cage regulation is not an effective measure which is also 
justified by its insignificant contribution to yield in the bioeconomic model. 
Regulation of both electric shiners and fish cages.  
Low level of implementation. Imposition of both controls yielded best results. 
Nevertheless, with the current investment levels or low enforcement, outcome of the 
NPV [-PHP10.4 million (-USD 194,139)], BCR (0.89) and IRR (less than 0%) are still 
not favorable. This is because the increase in fish catch brought about by the 
implementation of law is quite small to offset the diminishing productivity of the bay.  
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Table 8 Net Present Value, Benefit Cost Ratio and Internal Rate of Return by 
Scenario/Policy Option, 2002-2006. 
 
Scenario/Policy  Option NPV BCR IRR(%) 
No regulation (14,565,542.83) 0.85  <0 
Shiner ban 
 Current or low  level of 
investment/resources 
(10,838,875.81) 0.89  <0 
 With additional or high 
investment 
1,422,314.36  1.01  61.73  
Fish cage regulation 
 Current or low level of 
investment/resources 
(14,102,989.61) 0.85  <0 
 With additional or high 
investment 
(1,207,723.15) 0.99  <0 
Shiner and fish cage ban 
 Current or low level of 
investment/resources 
(10,356,433.41) 0.89  <0 
 With additional or high 
investment 
2,294,793.92  1.02  93.29  
 
High level of implementation. Provision of additional resources or high enforcement 
indicates that the government is not getting more out of its investment as shown in the 
BCR of 1.02 and 1.01. The benefits exceed the costs but only by a slight margin.  
However, fishermen’s income will increase if ban on shiners as well as ban on both 
shiners and fish cages are strictly enforced as shown by the positive NPV. Restricting 
the total number of ITPs awarded as is through the years requires maintaining the same 
number of fishermen/boats. The bay cannot afford to maintain another boat as indicated 
by the bioeconomic model where the marginal product is declining. Furthermore, 
historical data shows a drop in CPUE from 1965 to 2001 by 12 to 2 kg per fishing trip 
for hook and line, and by 52 to 10 kg per fishing trip for gill net. The model showed that 
fishing effort of milkfish fry gatherers, electric shiners, fish cages, hook and line, 
multiple hooks and gill nets are negatively related to yields of fish, reflecting the fact 
that Lamon Bay is overexploited. An increase in the level of fishing effort did not 
increase yield in all fishing gears but instead resulted in declining fish catch. One option 
for the LGU is to look into the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) policy for different fish 
species. Not yet enforced, this option is stipulated in Fisheries Code, Sec 2: “ it is the 
policy of the State to protect the rights of fishermen, especially of the local communities 
with priority to municipal fishermen, in the preferential use of the municipal waters. 
Such preferential use, shall be based on, but not limited to, Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY) or Total Allowable Catch (TAC) on the basis of resources and ecological 
conditions, and shall be consistent with commitments under international treaties and 
agreement.”  
Maintaining the number of ITPs as is through the years does not reflect significant 
changes to the bay’s resources and the fishermen’s income. The LGUs should 
confiscate and even recall the ITPs awarded to fishermen who continue to violate the 
regulations in the succeeding years. In this way, the ITPs will decrease yearly, as an 





There is a need for other livelihood activities and income diversification for fishing 
households to reduce fishing and economic pressures exerted on the bay. Only a small 
number of fishermen respondents have a secondary occupation. Most members of the 
fishermen’s households are idle. They have time to engage in possible livelihood 
employment opportunities and are equipped with appropriate educational requirement. 
If the alternative sources of income are sustainable, fishermen can also be attracted to 
shift their economic activities thus reducing fishing pressure on the bay. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted on the condition that supplementary funds will be 
used to fully implement and monitor the considered policies. It was assumed that 
increases in fish catch are: 1% for the imposition of ban on electric shiners; 0.5% for the 
regulation of fish cages; and 1.25% for the enforcement of both policies. 
Results showed that even if fish catch decreases by half the expected yields and 
fishermen obtain a positive income, regulations on the prohibition of electric shiners 
and fish cages will produce small returns of investment to the government. 
Given the low income from fishing and the idle time of the fishermen as well their 
spouses and children, provision of alternative sources of income is imperative. 
Organizations of municipal fishermen should be strengthened so they could eventually 
serve as conduits of support services. There should be regular monitoring of the bay and 
strict implementation of the policies coupled with the political will to execute these 
regulations. 
7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Although Lamon Bay is one of the top ten fishing grounds in the Philippines, fish catch 
in this area has been declining by 13.5% annually which is more than twice the national 
average of 5.4%. Several fishery policies had been implemented in Lamon Bay for its 
development, management and conservation. However, no study has been conducted to 
determine the efficiency and effectiveness of these policies. 
Using data from secondary sources and from an original survey, a bioeconomic model 
was used to simulate the effects of changes in enforcement levels of three current 
fisheries policies : ban on electric shiners, regulation on fish cage, as well as both 
shiners and fish cages. These were evaluated using the BCA. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this study: 
Lamon Bay is overexploited as indicated by the small length and high exploitation rate 
values of most fish species.  
An increase in the level of fishing effort did not increase yield in all fishing gears but 
instead resulted in a decline in fish catch. This implies that the bay is overfished. 
The marginal productivity of Lamon Bay is decreasing for all gears, meaning that one 
additional gear in the bay will reduce the average fish catch of all gears. 
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A typical fisherman in Lamon Bay lies below the poverty line and has no secondary 
source of income. His household members are mostly idle but are equipped with 
educational requirements for gainful activities. 
The institutions responsible for implementing fisheries policies in Lamon Bay are 
constrained by lack of funds, political will and technical know-how for monitoring. 
Stringent enforcement of current fisheries policies [costing the government PHP 
614,000 (USD 11,500) per year] would result in insignificant benefits relative to costs 
(i.e. benefit-cost ratios of 1.02 or less). The return on the government’s investment 
would be negligible because enforcement of current regulations does nothing to reduce 
open access, the root cause of overfishing.  
A potentially more effective policy to deal with open access and overfishing is to set a 
limit on the total number of fish that can be caught and divide this quota among Lamon 
Bay’s fishermen. Although the imposition of a total allowable catch is stipulated in the 
new Fisheries Code, no effort has yet been made to implement this in Lamon Bay. This 
scheme would limit the volume of fish harvested particularly overexploited species. 
Over time, the total allowable catch might be reduced. (The easiest way to make the 
initial reductions would be to revoke the permits of fishermen who contravene the 
fishing regulations). To allow flexibility, the quotas allocated to individual fishermen 
might be tradable. Among other things, this would allow new fishermen to enter the 
industry - but only by buying a quota from an existing holder. This system of individual 
tradable quotas or permits has been very successful in New Zealand (New York Times 
Magazine: August 2000). 
Complementing this could be alternative livelihood projects to wean fishermen and their 
family members away from fishing. Most fishermen are poor and have no secondary 
source of income. Their household members are usually idle but employable. An 
integrated coastal management plan is imperative; it should seek to develop alternative 
sources of income that will reduce fishing pressure on the bay.  
 
8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policies are important in regulating open access fishery resources. High enforcement of 
fishery policies, however, do not necessarily mean that the government will be getting 
more out of its investment in monitoring and implementation particularly when the bay 
is overfished, overexploited, its marginal productivity decreasing and CPUE is likewise 
decreasing. Therefore, in order to effectively implement fisheries policies to benefit 
both the government and the fishermen, as well as increase productivity of the bay, 
government policies should give priority to the following recommendations: 
 The Government should require and sell individual transferable permits to existing 
resident-fishermen so that new entrants will not be allowed to fish unless they 
purchase from one who owns. Individual transferable permits of violators should be 
confiscated and suspended. This will maintain if not decrease the number of 
fishermen in the bay. 
 The Government should enforce the policy of total allowable catch on overexploited 






 The Government should look for alternative sources of income for the fisherman 
and his household members who belong to the labor force are educationally 
equipped yet remain idle and engaged in non-gainful activities. This can be done 
through the cooperation of NGOs, POs and community organizations to decrease 
fishing pressure on the bay and increase fishermen’s income which is currently 
below the poverty threshold. Training and support services (credit facilities, market) 
should be provided to ensure sustainability of these projects. 
 The Government should design an integrated coastal management plan for the area, 
incorporating out-migration programs for alternative sources of income to fishing 
which should be sufficient to offset rapid population growth in the coastal 
communities. This should be backed up by adequate support to the institutional 
mechanisms in the bay. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
A priori A term used to identify a type of knowledge which is obtained 
independently of experience 
BCA   Benefit Cost Analysis 
BCR   Benefit Cost Ratio 
BIHADA  Biyayang Handog ng Dalampasigan, a non-governmental 
organization that opposed a resolution passed in 1998 in Infanta 
imposing a two-year ban on gathering of milkfish fry in the 
municipal waters. 
BFAR   Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
CB-CRMP  Community Based - Coastal Resource Management Program 
COPE Foundation Community Organization of the Philippines Enterprise 
CPUE   Catch per unit effort 
CRM   Coastal Resource Management 
DA   Department of Agriculture 
FARMC  Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Council 
GO    Government Organization 
ICDAI   Infanta Integrated Community Development Assistance, Inc. 
IRA   Internal Revenue Allotment 
LGU   Local Government Unit 
MAFC   Municipal Agriculture and Fisheries Council  
M & E   Monitoring and Evaluation 
MDC   Municipal Development Council 
MFARMC   Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management Council  
MO   Municipal Ordinance 
MOr   Municipal Order 
MPDC   Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator 
Multicollinearity Multicollinearity among independent variables was observed in 
the initial attempt of estimation. This means that though the 





yield values were high. The model fits the data well, even though 
none of the independent variables has a statistically significant 
impact on predicting yield. This is possible when two 
independent variables are highly correlated and they both convey 
essentially the same information. In this case, neither may 
contribute significantly to the model after the other one is 
included. But together they contribute a lot. If you remove both 
variables from the model, the fit would be much worse. So the 
overall model fits the data well, but neither independent variable 
makes a significant contribution when it is added to your model 
last. When this happens, the independent variables are collinear 
and the results show multicollinearity.  
NGO   Non-government Organization 
NPV   Net Present Value 
OMA   Office of the Municipal Agriculturist 
PISAMAKPO Pederasyon ng Samahang Makakalikasan ng Polillo – Federation 
of Environmentalists in Polillo 
PO   People’s Organization 
Res   Resolution 
SAMALIB Samahang Likas Bisig ng Infanta – Association of 
Environmentalists in Infanta 
SB   Sangguniang Bayan – law-making body at the village level 
SIPAKAT, Inc. Samahang Ipagtanggol ang Kapakatan – organization formed to
   protect the rights of fishermen 
SWOT   Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats 
 
 
 
 
